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THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF
AUGUSTE COMTE.
BY HARRY ELMER BARNES.
I. LIFE AND WORKS.
IT was one hundred years in May of this year since Auguste
Comte pubHshed the famous prospectus of his comprehensive
social philosophy under the title of Plan dcs travaux scientifiques
ncccssaires pour reorganiser la societe} In the century which has
passed many one-sided philosophies of society have been proposed
and many incomplete schemes of social reform propounded. Many
writers in recent years have, however, tended to revert to the
position of Comte that we must have a philosophy of society which
includes a consideration of biological, psychological and historical
factors, and a program of social reform which will provide for an
increase both in technical efficiency and in social morale.- Further,
there has also developed a wide-spread distrust of the "pure"
democracy of the last century and a growing feeling that we must
endeavor more and more to install in positions of political and
social power that intellectual aristocracy in which Comte placed his
faith as the desirable leaders in the reconstruction of European
society.'' In the light of the above facts a brief analysis of the
political and social philosophy of Comte may have practical as well
as historical interest to students of philosophy and social science.
Auguste Comte ws born in MontpelHer in 1798, and received
his higher education at the Ecole Polytcchnique. During six years
1 See the brief article on this matter in the American Journal of
Sociology, January, 1922, pp. 510-13.
- See Publications of the American Sociological Society, 1920, pp.
174-202; and G. S. Hall, Morale: the Supreme Standard of Life and
Conduct.
3 For an extreme statement of this point of view see E. Faguet,
The Cult of Incompetence.
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of his young manhood he was a close friend and ardent disciple
of the progressive French thinker, Henri de Saint Simon.* In
1834 there came a sharp break which led Comte into a somewhat
ungracious depreciation of his former master. They differed
chiefly in the degree to which they placed confidence in the revo-
lutionary philosophy and tendencies of the times, Comte being in-
clined to take a more conservative position than his teacher.
Comte's earliest work of importance was the prospectus of his
social philosophy which was mentioned above.^ In 1826 he worked
out in lectures the first formal exposition of the principles of the
Positivist philosophy in his own home, where he was honored by
the attendance of such distinguished men as the scientist Alexander
von Humboldt.
Comte's first great work—the Cours dc philosophic positive—
appeared between the years 1830 and 1842. From 1836 until 1846
he was an examiner for the Ecole Polytechnique. After his dis-
missal from this position he was supported chiefly by contributions
from his disciples and admirers. His friendship with Clotilde de
Vaux (1845-G) doubtless contributed strongly to Comte's eulogy
of women which appeared particularly in his Polity. He founded
the Positivist Society in 1848. Comte's last and most important
work—the Systcme de politique positiz'c—appeared between 1851
and 1854. He died in 1857."
In the first of his chief works—the Philosophy—Comte
worked out in more detail than in his earlier sketches and essays
his main theoretical positions. These include the hierarchy of the
sciences; the necessity for, and the nature of, sociology, with its
two main divisions of social statics and social dynamics ; and the
law of the three stages of universal progress, with ample historical
illustrations and confirmation. The Polity was a detailed expansion
of his theoretical doctrines, and their practical application to the
construction of a "Positive" or scientifically designed common-
wealth. While many are inclined to maintain that the Philosophy
contains all of Comte's important contributions to sociology, such
4 See W. H. Schoff, "A Neglected Chapter in the Life of Comte,"
in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
vol. 8, 1896, pp. 491-508.
5 For a list of Comte's works see M. Defourny, La Sociologie
positiviste, pp. 19-22.
c An excellent brief survey of Comte's life is to be found in John
Morley's article on. "Comte" in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica.
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is far from the case.^ Though the Polity is verbose, prolix, in-
volved and repetitious, nearly all of Comte's chief postulates are
developed in it with far greater maturity and richness of detail
than in the Philosophy.^
II .COMTE'S GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY.
It is generally conceded by the foremost students of Comte's
social philosophy that his chief contribution lay in his remarkable
capacity for synthesis and organization, rather than in the de-
velopment of new and original social doctrines. He derived much
from writers on social philosophy from Aristotle to Saint-Simon.
From Aristotle he derived his fundamental notion as to the basis
of social organization, namely, the distribution of functions and
the combination of efforts. From Hume, Kant and Gall he re-
ceived his conceptions of positivism in method and his physical
psychology. From Hume, Kant and Turgot he obtained his views
of historical determinism, and from Bossuet, Vico and DeMaistre
his somewhat divergent doctrine of the providential element in
history. From Turgot, Condorcet, Burdin and Saint-Simon he
derived his famous law of the three stages in the intellectual de-
velopment of mankind. From Montesquieu, Condorcet and Saint-
Simon he secured his conception of sociology as the basic and
directive science which must form the foundation of the art of
politics. Each had made special contributions to this subject.
Montesquieu had introduced the conception of law in the social
process, stressing particularly the influence of the physical environ-
ment; Condorcet had emphasized the concept of progress; while
Saint-Simon had insisted upon the necessity of providing a science
of society sufficiently comprehensive to guide this process of social
and industrial reorganization. It was the significant achievement
of Comte to work out an elaborate synthesis of these progressive
contributions of the thought of the previous century and to indi-
^ Cf. L. Chiappini, Les Idees politiques d'Auguste Comte, Intro-
duction.
8 This point has been especially stressed by Comte himself, and
by G. H. Lewes and Frederic Harrison. For a vigorous attack on the
value of the Polity see Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences, vol. 8, 1896, p. 506.
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cate the bearing of this new social science upon the problems of
European society in the nineteenth century.®
The outstanding doctrines of Comte, namely, the classification
of the hierarchy of the sciences with sociology at the head; the
division of this subject into statics and dynamics; the law of the
three stages of universal progress; and the conception of the
organic nature of society, with its corollary of society as a de-
veloping organism, have been so often repeated in resumes of
sociological theory that they have become common-places. Even
a cursory reading of Comte's major works, however, is bound to
impress the reader with the fact that he had much more to offer
than can be intelligently summarized under the above headings.
There are few problems in social theory or history that he did not
touch upon.^°
Comte's fundamental methodological position is that if human
knowledge is to be extended in the future this must be accom-
plished through the application of the positive or scientific method
of observation, experimentation, and comparison. Sociological in-
vestigation must follow this general procedure, with the addition
that when the comparative method has been applied to the study
of consecutive stages of human society, a fourth method, the his-
torical, will have been constructed, from which may be expected
the most notable results.^^ Nothing fruitful can be hoped for from
the metaphysicians. Comte's strictures upon their methods and
results are particularly vigorous and to some equally convincing.^^
Comte constructed a hierarchy of the sciences, beginning with
mathematics and passing through astronomy, physics, chemistry,
and biology to the new science of sociology, which was to complete
the series. The fundamental theoretical foundations of this classi-
9 F. Alengry, La Sociologie chez Auguste Comte, pp. 389 ff., 435-
76; Defourny, op. cit., pp. 350-54; H. Michel, L 'Idee de I'etat, pp.
451-58. For studies of Comte's thought see E. Littre, Auguste Comte
et la philosophie positive; Depuy, Le Positivisme d' Auguste Comte;
L. Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte; G. H. Lewes,
Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences; and E. Caird, The Social Philo-
sophy and Religion of Comte.
10 An excellent attempt to estimate Comte's contribution to social
science has been made in French by Defourny, op. cit.; and Alengry,
op. cit. A more special treatment of his political theories is at-
tempted by Fezensoc, Le Systeme politique d' Auguste Comte; and by
Chiappini, Les Idees politiques d' Auguste Comte. In German we
have H. Waentig, Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung filr Social-
wissenschaft.
11 Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of Comte, Vol. II, pp.
241-257.
12 Polity, Vol. I, pp. 58-60, III, p. 446, IV, pp. 564, 646.
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fication were : First, that each science depends upon those below
it in the series; second, that as one advances along the series the
subjects become more specific, complex, and less amenable to
scientific measurement and prediction ; and, finally, that the diffi-
culties of sociology are due to the greater complexity of the
phenomena with which it deals and the contemporary lack of
proper investigation and measurement of these phenomena, rather
than to any generic difference in desirable or possible methodology
or procedure.^^
While Comte did not elaborate to any great extent the organic
conception of society, still he may be said to have offered the sug-
gestions for the later school of so-called "Organicists" and is
notable for holding that the organic doctrine was no mere analogy
but a reality. It is the individual who is an abstraction rather
than the social organism. Coker has summed up in the following
manner his organic doctrines to be found in the Philosophie
positive: Society is a collective organism, as contrasted to the in-
dividual organism or plant, and possesses the primary organic
attribute of the consensus nniversel. There is to be seen in the
organism and in society a harmony of structure and function
working towards a common end through action and reaction
among its parts and upon the environment. This harmonious de-
velopment reaches its highest stage in human society, which is the
final step in organic evolution. Social progress is characterized
by an increasing specialization of functions and a corresponding
tendency towards an adaptation and perfection of organs. Finally,
social disturbances are maladies of the social organism and the
proper subject-matter of social pathology.'^* In the Polity he
elaborated the similarity between the individual and the social
organism. In the family may be found the social cell ; in the
social forces may be discerned the social tissues; in the state (city)
may be discovered the social organs; in the various nations are to
be detected the social analogues of the systems in biology.^^ The
great difference between the individual organism and the social
organism lies in the fact that the former is essentially immutable,
13 Martineau, Volume I, Chapters I-II, particularly, pp. 8, 29.
Cf. G. H. Lewes, Comte's Philosophy of Science, See the discussions
of this classification by H. Spencer, Classification of the Sciences; F.
H. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 45ff; L. F. Ward, Pure
Sociology, pp. 65ff.
14 F. W. Coker, Organismic Theories of the State, pp. 123-4; Cf.
L. T. Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 204.
-^^ Polity, II, pp. 240-242.
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while the latter is capable of immense improvement, if guided ac-
cording to scientific principles. Another distinction is that the
social organism allows a far greater distribution of functions com-
bined with a higher degree of coordination of organs.'"
Sociology, Comte defined specifically as the science of social
order and progress, and, in a more general way, as the science of
social phenomena.^" It is closely related to biology, the subject-
matter of the latter being organization and life ; that of sociology
order and progress.^®
Comte divides sociology- into two major departments, social
statics, or thcorie gaierale de I'ordre spontane des societies
humaines, and social dynamics, or theorie generale du progres
natttrcl de I'humanite}^ He finds that the underlying basis of
social order is the principle which he assigns to Aristotle, though
it probably belongs more rightfully to Plato, namely, the distri-
bution of functions and the combination of efforts, the former
takes shape in the specialization and division of labor in society,
and the latter is realized through the institution of government.^"
The government principle in social progress is to be found in
the law of the three stages of intellectual advance.-^ Through each
of these stages—the theological, metaphysical, and scientific
—
there must pass the proper development and education of the in-
dividual, the various realms of human knowledge, and the general
process of social evolution. None of these stages can be elimi-
nated, though intelligent direction may hasten the process and
lack of wisdom retard it.-- Each stage is the necessary antecedent
of the following one, and any period is as perfect as the condition
of the time will allow. All institutions are, thus, relative in their
degree of excellence and none can hope to attain to absolute per-
i« Martineau, II, pp. 258-62, 299-301; Philosophie positive, fifth
edition, 1893, Vol. IV, pp. 469-81.
I'Martineau, pp. 140-141, 218, 258; III, pp. 383-5.
isMartineau, II, pp. 140-141.
19 Philosophie positive, IV, pp. 430, 498.
2^ Polity, II, pp. 242-4.
21 Martineau, Vol. I, pp. 1-3, and Vol. Ill passim; see also L. T.
Hobhouse in Sociological Review, Vol. I, pp. 262-79. Comte possessed
almost as great a love for triads as did Vico. Thus, he finds three
stages of intellectual progress, three divisions of cerebral functions,
three types of social forces, three gTades of society, three social classes,
three stages of religion, and three classes of regulating power in
society.
22 Polity, IV, translated by Congreve, General Index, 1822, pp.
558-60.
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fection.^^ Objectively considered progress may be regarded as
consisting in man's increasing control over the environment.^*
Again, progress may be broken up into three constituent parts, in-
tellectual, material, and moral. Intellectual progress is to be found
in the law of the three stages; material progress in "an analogous
progression in human activity which in its first stage is Conquest,
then Defense ; and lastly Industry" ; and moral progress "shows
that man's social nature follows the same course ; that it finds
satisfaction, first in the Family, then in the State, and lastly in the
Race." ^^ In securing progress the desires and emotions are the
driving forces and the intellectual factors are the guiding and
restraining agencies.^''
While Comte's philosophy of history has been criticized by
many for being too one-sided and merely stressing the intellectual
factors ^^ most of his critics have overlooked those passages in
which he foreshadows Spencer and Giddings by describing the
three great stages of human progress as the Military-Theological
;
the Critical-Metaphysical; and the Industrial-Scientific.-^
Comte laid great stress upon the family as a fundamental
social institution and upon religion as one of the most important
regulating agencies in society. While somewhat utilitarian in his
attitude towards the social applications of religion, his exposition
of the principles of the Positivist creed is developed in great detail
in the Polity. His doctrines regarding the basic importance of the
family and religion, appreciated by Ward, have been recently re-
vived with a more scientific analysis and application by Professor
Ellwood.29
23 Cf. Michel, op. cit., p. 432; Martineau, II, pp. 232-4. This doc-
trine of the relativity of the excellence of institutions was not, how-
ever, an original conception, as Dr. L. M. Bristol would seem to indi-
cate, Social Adaptation, pp. 20-1, for it was perhaps the central
feature of Montesquieu's philosophy.
2^ Polity, II, pp. 235-9.
25 Ibid, IV, p. 157.
26 Ibid, III, pp. 55fF. Cf . L. F. Ward, Pure Sociology, Chaps. VI,
XVI.
2 7 Cf. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 303-4.
^» Philosophie positive, IV, pp. 17ff, 578-87; Polity, III, pp. 44-45
and passim. Cf. W. A. Dunning, Political Theories from Rausseau to
Spencer, pp. 393-4. "Whatever addition it may receive, and whatever
corrections it may require, this analysis of social evolution will con-
tinue to be regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the
human intellect." Morley, loc. cit. Benn with undue enthusiasm de-
clares it the best sketch of universal history ever written
—
Modern
Philosophy, p. 156.
^^ Sociology and Modern Social Problems, pp. 74ff; Sociology in
its Psychological Aspects, pp. 186-7, 356-8; The Social Problem, pp.
189ff; The Reconstruction of Religion.
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Finally, as Lester F. Ward so clearly pointed out, Conite holds
that the great practical value of sociology is to be looked for in its
application to scientific social reform, and in his most elaborate
work he develops at great length what he believes will be the
ultimate type of social organization, if society is wise enough to
study and apply the science which investigates the laws of its
organization and progress.^"
II. SPECIFIC POLITICAL DOCTRINES.
1. Sociology and Political Science.
Comte makes no clear distinction between political science and
sociology. Indeed, he seems to regard sociology as the perfected
political science of the future. At the same time, he clearly
dilferentiates sociology from the older political philosophy, as
dominated by metaphysical methods and concepts. Sociology has
nothing in common with the old a priori method that characterized
the earlier political philosophy. It must be based on the assured
scientific procedure of observation, experimentation and com-
parison.^^ It is doubtful if Comte conceived it as possible that
there could be a science of the state distinct from the general
science of society.-"' At any rate, his political theory is inextricably
connected with his psychology, theology, ethics, and economics,
which are included within his sociology. In general, Comte denied
that the special social sciences were true sciences. He held that
society must be studied as a whole by a unitary science
—
sociolog>^^^ Political science, to Comte, was that part of his
sociology which was concerned with the history of the state and
the theory and practice of its organization, but he rarely, if ever,
treated these subjects in isolation, but dealt with each as a part of
social evolution and organization as a whole.^*
2. The Nature of the State.
Comte's ideas concerning the nature of the state and its dis-
tinction from society, nation, and government are vague and un-
30 Polity, passim, particularly Vols. II, IV.
31 Martineau, II, pp. 241-57.
32 Ibid, pp. 225-6.
33 Cf. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, p. 28.
34 Martineau, II, pp. 210-22, 235. Polity, IV, pp. 558-60, General
Appendix, 3rd part, "Plan of the Scientific Operation necessary for
the Scientific Reorganization of Society."
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certain. Comte was too much interested in the ultimate Positivist
society of the future to devote much attention to an elaboration of
the theoretical foundations of the contemporary national bourgeois
state. This was, at best, merely a transitory form of social organi-
zation. "Between the city, uniting man and his dwelling place,
and the full development of the Great Being around a fitting
centre, a number of intermediate forms of association may be
found, under the general name of states. But all of these forms,
differing only in extent and permanence, may be neglected as un-
defined." ^° Comte's whole position would have made it hard for
him to conceive clearly such an entity as society politically
organized, as distinct in practice, at least, from its material and
spiritual aspects. His own theory of society was so all-inclusive,
with its mixture of family ethics, theological dogmas and economic
arrangements with politics, that it was not favorable to clearly
differentiated concepts in the political realm. The only point on
which he may be said to be unmistakably clear is his dogma that
there can be no fixed social relations of any permanence without
a political organization, that is, a government. The first principle
of positive political theory, he says, is that "society without a
government is no less impossible than a government without
society. In the smallest as well as in the largest associations, the
Positive theory of a polity never loses sight of these two cor-
relative ideas, without which theories woud lead us astray, and
society would end in anarchy."" When, however, Comte begins to
discuss the governmental arrangements in his state or society he
immediately introduces conceptions quite foreign to orthodox
notions of governmental organization by his advocacy of increas-
ing governmental rectitude through the influence of family
morality, and by entrusting its encouragement and surveillance to
the priests of the religion of Humanity. In short, it seems that
Comte regarded the state as the organ for the direction of the
general material activities of society. While this Is the most fre-
quent connotation of the term state, as employed by Comte, he
often uses it in sense identical with the nation and with society
in general. ^^
Upon the question as to what constitutes the fundamental
attributes of the state, Comte is a little more clear. In fact, he
quite agrees with what are now considered the indispensable at-
^^ Polity, II, p. 241.
36 Ibid, 224; Cf. Philosophie positive, Vol. IV, pp. 485-95.
37 Cf. Chiappini, op. cit, pp. 97ff.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTS COMTE. 433
tributes of any state or political society, namely, population, terri-
tory, a sovereign power, and a governmental organization. He is
particularly insistent upon the territorial prerequisite for the
state. ^''' His belief in the indispensability of government has just
been pointed out above. Finally, in his unequivocal statement of
the necessity of adequate social control in any stable society and
the recognition that political organization ultimately rests upon
force, Comte makes it plain that he discerned the necessity of a
sovereign power for the creation and maintenance of a permanent
political society.^^ Comte also anticipated the modern trends in
political science by stressing the importance of the psychological
and economic factors in the state. He sums up his position on
these points very briefly in the following passage: "When Prop-
erty, Family, and Language, have found a suitable Territory, and
have reached the point at which they combine any given population
under the same, at least the same spiritual, government, there a
possible nucleus of the Great Being has been formed. Such a
community, or city, be it ultimately large or small, is a true organ
of Humanity.*" More than the mere statement of Comte's doc-
trines regarding the fundamental elements of any state, this
passage is an admirable example of how he was wont to introduce
into political thought highly visionary and figurative ethical and
theological concepts.
3. The Genesis of Political Institutions.
A. Philosophical Analysis of Principles.
Comte treated the subject of the origin of society, state, and
government in both an analytical and in an historical manner. In
his analytical treatment he based his procedure on the Aristotelian
dogma of the inherent sociability of mankind and declared the
notion of a state of nature mere metaphysical nonsense, and the
allied contract theory of political origins untenable.*^ Man, he
held, prevailed over the other animals because of his superior
sociability, and in developing this important element of a social
38 Polity, II, pp. 237, 241. For his excessive emphasis on this
point he is criticized by Defourny, op. cit., pp. 133-6, 301-2.
39 Polity, Vol. II, pp. 247-9. See below, however, for an account
of his failure to develop a theory of sovereignty.
40 Polity, II, p. 241.
*^ Philosophie positive, pp. 431-47; Martineau, II, pp. 157-8.
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nature the prolongation of human infancy was perhaps the most
important factor.^^
The unit of society, according to Comte, is not the individual
but the family. The great function of the family in history has
been to generate the basic elements which would ultimately pro-
duce the state. The growth and perfection of language was the
main factor making it possible for the state to develop from the
family :*^
A society, therefore, can no more be decomposed into indi-
ifiduals than a geometric surface can be resolved into lines, or a
line into points. The simplest association, that is, the family,
sometimes reduced to its original couple, constitutes the true unit
of society. From it flow the more complex groups, such as classes
and cities.^*
During the whole continuance of the education of the race,
the principal end of the Domestic Order is gradually to form the
Political Order. It is from this latter, finally, that the critical in-
fluence originates, whereby the family affections are raised up to
their high social office, and prevented from degenerating into col-
lective selfishness.*^
While society, in a psychological sense, is ultimately based
upon the social instinct, grounded in sympathy and expressed
mainly in the family, the wider and more highly developed forms
of social organization, as exemplified by the state and society, are
based upon the Aristotelian principle of the distribution of
functions and the combination of efforts.*^ It is this cooperative
distribution of functions which marks off the political society from
the domestic association, which is based upon sympathy.*^ The
great point of superiority of the social organism over the indi-
vidual organism is that it allows of a higher degree of distri-
bution of functions, coordinated with a more perfect adaptation
of organs. The perfect distribution of functions and coordination
of organs in society is the ultimate goal of social evolution, and it
is in a study of the relation between these two principles that one
is to look for the relation between society and government.*^ The
^^ Polity, I, pp. 511-13. Cf. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, Bk.
Ill, Chaps, i-ii; J. Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, pp.
340-44, 360-69.
'^^ Polity, Vol. II, pp. 153, 183; Philosophic positive, Vol. IV, pp.
447-469.
44 Ibid, p. 153.
« Ibid, p. 183.
46 Ibid, pp. 234, 242; Philosophic positive, IV, pp. 469-81.
^^ Polity, II, p. 242.
^^Philosophic positive. Vol. IV, pp. 469-81; Polity, Vol. II, pp.
243-4.
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reason for this is that too much speciaHzation, while it leads to the
development of a great skill and a high degree of interest in
narrow fields, is liable to result in the disintegration of society-
through a loss of the conception of the unity of the whole and of
the mutual relations between the individual and society. It is the
function of government to coordinate human activities, and to
guard against the dangerous elements in specialization, while, at
the same time, conserving its beneficial effects.*^
In proportion as a distribution of functions is realized in
society there results a natural and spontaneous process of subordi-
nation, the principle being that those in any occupation come
under the direction of the class which has control over their
general type of functions, i. e., the next class above them in the
hierarchy of industrial differentiation. Government tends naturally
to arise out of the controlling and directing forces which are at
first centered in the smaller and functional groups of society. In
the past, war has been the chief factor in unifying in one central
unit this divided governmental power. Industry, however, is com-
ing more and more to be the source of social discipline and gov-
ernmental control. ^° "The habits of command and of obedience
already formed in Industry have only to extend to public spheres,
to found a power in the State capable of controlling the
divergencies, and regulating the convergencies, of the individuals
within it." ^^
This material basis of government in the principles of the
division of labor, combination of efforts, and superiority and
subordination ^^ harmonizes with the psychic characteristics of
humanity, which leads some to command and others to obey.
While it is necessary to recognize the almost universal desire to
^^ Philosophie positive, Vol. IV, pp. 481-7; Polity, Vol. II, pp.
243-4.
"Cette conception constitue, a mes yeux^ la premiere base posi-
tive et rationelle de la theories elementaire et abstraite du governe-
ment, proprement, dit, envisagee dans sa plus noble et plus entiere ex-
tension scientifique, c'-est-a-dire, comme caracterise en general par 1'
universelle reaction necessaire d 'abord spontanee et en suite regu-
larisee, de 1 'ensemble sur les parties."
Philosophie Positive, Vol. IV, p. 485.
"Fidele a la pensee de Comte, nous pouvons definir le gouverne-
ment dans son sens general et propre, la force de cohesion sociale qui
agit, ou mieux encore le principe de cooperation mis en oeuvre."
Chiappini, op. cit., pp. 102.3.
^0 Philosophie positive, Vol. IV, pp. 487-93; Polity, Vol. II, 245-6.
Cf. Spencer's doctrine of the military and industrial orders in society.
^^ Polity, Vol. II, p. 246.
'^^ Cf. the doctrine of von Haller and Simmel.
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command, it is no less essential to observe that people find it very
agreeable to throw the burden of expert guidance upon others.^^
But one must go beyond this fundamental analytical basis of
the state, in the distribution of functions and the combination of
efforts to construct a complete system of political philosophy.
With this Aristotelian axiom must be combined the Hobbesian
notion of force as the ultimate foundation upon which govern-
mental organization rests. "Social science would remain forever
in the cloud-land of mataphysics, if we hesitated to adopt the
principle of Forces as the basis of Government. Combining this
doctrine with that of Aristotle, that society consists in the Combi-
nation of efforts and the Distribution of functions, we get the
axioms of a sound political philosophy." ^*
To the doctrines of Aristotle and Hobbes, however, must be
added the more specific notions of Comte himself. He finds that,
in addition to the requirements just named, there is demanded an
efficient general regulating power or system of social control.
"Close study^ therefore, show^s us that there are three things
necessary for all political power, besides the basis of material
Force : an Intellectual guidance, a Moral sanction, and lastly a
Social control." ^^ This regulating power is to be found in the
religion of humanity and is to be administered by the priests of
that cult.^^' There are, thus, in the perfect state three grades of
society : the family based on feeling or affection ; the state or city
based on action ; and the church based primarily on intelligence,
but, in reality, synthesizing all three. ^^ These grades of society
correspond to, and have their basis in, the three fundamental
powers or functions of man's cerebral system, which Comte took
from Gall's phrenology and made the basis of his psychology and
much of his social science.''^
This final element, the church, with its universal surveillance
and guidance of all social activities, will make possible the dis-
solution of the great tyrannical states and the completion of the
53 "Ainse la spontaneite fondamentale des diverses dispositions
individuelles se montre essentiellement en harmonie avec le cours
necessaire de 1 'ensemble des relations sociales pour etablir que la sub-
ordination politique est. en general, aussi inevitable qu 'indispensible.
Philosophie positive. Vol. IV, pp. 493-5. Ci. Polity, Vol. II, p. 244. Cf.
Giddings' theory of "Protocracy" in his Responsible State, pp. 17ff.
^* Polity, Vol. II, p. 247.
^5 Ibid, p. 249.
56/6id, p. 249-50.
5-' Ibid, pp. 250-1.
58 Cf. Martineau, Vol. II, Chapter VI; Polity, Vol. I, pp. 540-93.
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social organism without any danger from anarchy or hcense.^'"' In
the place of the conventional political state, as it now exists, there
is to be a group of cities united by the common religious tutelege
provided by the worship of humanity as administered by its priests.
Such political entities are, after all, as large as any which could
be constituted without the entry of tyranny. Comte, thus, tended
partially to revive the localism and municipal character of the
Utopias of Plato and Aristotle, and, to a certain degree, anticipated
Le Play and modern regionalism
:
The foundation of a universal Church will enable the gradual
reduction of these huge and temporary agglomerations of men to
that natural limit, where the State can exist without tyranny . . .
No combination of men can be durable, if this is not really volun-
tary ; and in considering the normal form of the State we must
get rid of all artificial and violent bonds of union, and retain only
those which are spontaneous and free. Long experience has
proved that the City, in its full completeness and extent of sur-
rounding country, is the largest body politic which can exist with-
out becoming oppressive. . . . But besides this, the Positive
Faith, with its calm grasp over human life as a whole, will be
sufficient to unite the various Cities in the moral communion of
the Church, without requiring the help of the State to supplement
the task with its mere material unity.
Thus the final creation of a religious society whereby the great
organism is completed, fulfils all the three wants of the political
society. The intellectual guidance, the moral sanction, and the
social regulation which government requires to modify its material
nature, are all supplied by a Church, when it has gained a distinct
existence of its own.°*^
B. The Historical Evolution or Political Institutions.
In his treatment of- the origin of the state from a historical
point of view Comte reminds one of Hegel's narration of the suc-
cessive migrations of the Weltgeist until it finally settled among
the German people."^ Comte ranges over the history of humanity
and traces the stages through which the race has passed in its
preparation for the final goal of its evolution—the Positivist State.
One considerable difference between Hegel and Comte is that
Comte presented a much more accurate interpretation of the facts
^^ Polity, Vol. II, pp. 251-3, 304.
GO Ibid, p. 251. This independence of the Church is possible only
when its realm of domination is more extensive than that of the
political group. Polity, Vol. II, pp. 252-3.
61 Cf. Dittman, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und Kegels, ein
Vergleich," in Vierteljahrsschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie,
Vol. 38, pp. 281-312; Vol. 39, pp. 38-81.
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of history than Hegel and, when viewed in the hght of his times,
he is by no means so devoid of historical information as some
modern historical critics might seem to indicate.*^^ He seems to
have been acquainted with Gibbon and Hallam, for instance, and
grasped the significance of many fundamental movements in his-
tory, particularly in the field of economic development, which
escaped many later and more erudite "political historians." A
comprehensive grasp of the vital factors at work in history is as
essential to a true conception and interpretation of history as a
detailed knowledge of the objective facts of history. Judged by
this criterion Comte was no less of a real historian than many of
the extremely careful and critical "political historians" of the
nineteenth century.
It is beyond the purpose of the recent work to present in de-
tail Comte's philosophy of history. All that will be attempted is
a brief statement of his fundamental principles and a summary
of the portions dealing with the evolution of political institutions.
Comte's philosophy of history is based on as ingenious a system
of triads as distinguished the work of Vico.^^ In the first place,
social evolution, like social organization, is based on the tripartite
functions of man's cerebral system—feeling, action and intellect.
Feeling or emotion, which is the basis of morality, passes through
three stages in which man's social nature finds satisfaction first in
the family, then in the state, and finally in the race. Or, as he
puts it in other words, altruism in antiquity is domestic and civic,
in the Middle Ages collective, and in the Positive period it is uni-
versal.^* Still another way of describing this type of evolution is
to say that the sympathetic instincts of humanity advance through
the stages of attachment, veneration, and benevolence. There is a
close relationship between these different views of moral evolution,
as fetichism, which founded the family, also developed the feeling
of attachment
;
polytheism, which founded the state, fostered
veneration ; while monotheism, with its universality, favored the
sentiment of benevolence.*'^ Man's activational evolution proceeds
62 E, g. G. P. Gooch, History and Historians of the Nineteenth
Century, p. 585.
63 One should look for Comte's philosophy of history, not exclu-
sively in the last volumes of his philosophy, but in the third volume
of his Polity, for he himself tells the reader (Polity, Vol. Ill, p. 5)
that his complete theory is to be found only in that volume. For
Comte's most compact summary of his philosophy of history see the
Polity, Vol. Ill, pp. 421-2.
^'^ Polity, Vol. Ill, pp. 154-60.
65 Ibid, pp. 156-7,
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through the stages of conquest, defence and industry.*"' Finally,
the evolution of the intellect follows the famous three stages—the
theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific.®^ In this
process emotion is the dynamic power, action the agent of progress,
and intellect the guiding force.''^
Comte did not, therefore, as many writers would seem to
indicate, base his philosophy of history exclusively on the single
element of intellectual evolution. Even the law of the three stages
of intellectual progress aimed at a larger synthesis, which would
include material and spiritual factors, though probably the religious
element played a predominant part in his scheme. His periods of
intellectual development, in broad outline, were the theological,
divided into fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism ; the period of
the western revolution from 1300 to 1800 ; and the beginnings of
the positive period from 1800 onward. Each of these periods was
further subdivided.
(To he Continued)
66 Ibid, I, p. 507.
67 Ibid, IV, p. 157.
68 Cf, Ward, Pure Sociology, Chaps VI, XVI. Social evolution,
as a whole, is a combination of all three of these special types of
evolution. Defourny well summarizes this point: "L'evolution totale
de Tespece humaine peut done, en somme, se resumer sous cette forme:
La civilization a ete successivement d'abord theologique, militaire, et
civique; ensuite metaphysique, feodal, et chretienne; elle sera enfin
positive, industrielle, et universellement altruiste. Elle se caracterise
a chaque epoque a un triple point de rue, parce que I'homme est doue
d'un triple activite cerebrale." Op. cit. p. 151. Cf. W. A. Dunning,
Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer, pp. 393-4.
